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Introduction
In Iran’s history, there have been two prominent periods where international interference
has led to a marked decrease in state revenue. One of these periods was in 1953, when a Central
Intelligence Agency coup allowed the Anglo-Iranian oil company to reclaim possession of
Iranian oil. The second was in 2006 to 2015, when the international community imposed various
sanctions on Iran in order to curb the country’s nuclear weapons program. Charles Tilly’s theory
of state formation shows how the change in capital is tied to key events that changed the coercive
capacity of the Iranian government.
Literature Review
Two prominent theories of state formation are found in Charles Tilly’s Coercion, Capital,
and European States, AD 990-1990 (1990) and in Francis Fukuyama’s two volume work, The
Origins of Political Order: From prehuman times to the French Revolution (2011) and Political
Order and Political Decay: From the industrial revolution to the globalization of democracy
(2014).
Tilly’s argument is that states are characterized by their competition for territory and
population (Tilly, 1990, 4). People need resources to function, and resources are finite (Tilly,
1990). War is necessary for resource acquisition, and war costs money - in order to extract the
necessary funds or means to wage war, rulers had to have the power to force subjects to
surrender the needed funds or means (Tilly, 1990). Implementing coercive measures to tax
capital creates governments – in order to collect taxes for bureaucracy to function, tax collectors
must be in place to collect capital (Tilly, 1990). In order to acquire capital - the resources or
enforceable claims on resources - a ruler must first implement coercion (Tilly, 1990). Coercion is
“all concerted application, threatened or actual, of action that commonly causes loss or damage
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to the persons or possessions of individuals or groups who are aware of both the action and the
potential damage” (Tilly, 1990, 19). In other words, coercion is state capacity, employed for the
purpose of perpetuating the state. Once a ruler has used coercion to obtain capital, then they may
implement further coercion in the form of war. It is this tug of war “extraction and struggle over
the means of war created the central organizational structures of states.” (Tilly, 1990, 28). For
example, the need for state income created the need for taxes, and then for a bureau to manage
those taxes, and an accounting department to calculate taxes… And thus, layer by layer, the state
is formed. Over time, as the needs of the state change, institutions change and layers of
government are added or pulled away.
The unique character of each state is born out of the unique capital/coercion balance that
was necessary in the history of that state, and such a balance is always dependent upon the
relative relationship between two variables (Tilly, 1990). The various levels of capital and
coercion required to run a state depend on many factors, including population, geography,
culture, and resources. A state will attempt to find homeostasis (homeostatesis, if you will)
between capital and coercion. The relative level of capital to coercion within an individual state
is important to state formation. If coercion is too high and capital too low, then a regime could be
characterized as authoritarian. If there is too little coercion and too little capital, a state could be
characterized as a failed state. If there is high coercion and high capital, then a state could be
characterized as socialist or communist. It is the relative level of capital to coercion within the
state that is important, not the absolute levels of capital or coercion. This explains the variation
in states that were formed in European history (Tilly, 1990).
Francis Fukuyama establishes a different theoretical viewpoint. He claims that the
capital/coercion balance caused by warmaking is insufficient to explain the large variety of states
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around the globe (Fukuyama, 2011, 23). He points to other causal factors in state variation, such
as technology, physical geography, population density, and religion (Fukuyama, 2011, 23).
Fukuyama’s argument is that states are characterized by their institutions, and that a state
is made as institutions are formed, as institutions are the fundamental building blocks of an
effective and lasting government (Fukuyama, 2011). Institutions are rooted in human biological
need for social interaction, and repeated interactions over time create norms, which are then
formalized into institutions (Fukuyama, 2011). A good example is the family; the family unit of
an older generation of caregivers and a younger generation of dependents is a creation of biology
and dependence. An individual is viewed within the context of their family and their
relationships to others – they are a child, sister, husband, etc. Over time, this is institutionalized
through family names, for identification purposes. These institutions of relationships permeate
all levels of society.
Such “Institutions, according to Huntington, are ‘stable, valued, recurring patterns of
behavior’ whose most important function is to facilitate human collective action” (Fukuyama,
2014, 462). Institutions contribute to political order, or the ideas that create political associations
that shape ideas surrounding legitimacy and self-interest (Fukuyama, 2011, 16). Political order
provides the strength and stability needed for a strong state. However, “The very stability of
institutions is also the source of political decay. Institutions are created to meet the demands of
specific circumstances. However, the original environment in which institutions are created is
subject to change” (Fukuyama, 2014, 463). Political decay occurs when political systems fail to
adjust to changing circumstances (Fukuyama, 2011, 7). A strong and effective state must have
institutions that contribute to political order, while also providing mechanisms to correct for
political decay.
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The difference between Tilly’s theory and Fukuyama’s theory is an important one. Tilly
believes resources form states. Fukuyama claims that people and their institutions form states.
While people are a sufficient condition for states, people can only exist and perpetuate
themselves in a specific place if they have enough resources. If there are not enough resources to
support a population, the population will move or die off. As such, people are a sufficient
condition for a state, but resources are a necessary condition for a state.
While institutions are important factors in state formation, they are not exemptions to the
capital/coercion balance. Variable factors that Fukuyama notes, such as population density,
require an increased amount of capital to sustain and an increased amount of coercion to control.
This choice between Tilly’s theory of capital and coercion, and Fukuyama’s theory of
institutions, is a false dichotomy. Tilly’s theoretical framework of capital and coercion provides
the foundation for Fukuyama’s theoretical framework regarding institutions. Institutions, instead
of an alternative to capital and coercion, are the status quo maintenance of coercion and capital.
Such institutions are the sticky structure that supports the existing capital/coercion balance.
When the balance changes, the institutional needs change and political decay begins.
The state balance between capital and coercion is always changing, as states form and
reform themselves over time – the tension between political order and political decay is
constantly shaping the state.
When a state imposes sanctions, targeted or otherwise, they are inserting themselves into
the capital and coercion balance, and thereby instigating political order or political decay. In
order to implement effective sanctions, the imposing state must understand how its sanctions –
inherently a decrease in capital - will change the capital/coercion balance and change the nature
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of the target state. As such, an examination of the history of the target state is needed, in order to
comprehend how the sanctions will further or change the target state’s narrative.
Hypotheses
There are two hypotheses addressed in this paper, an overarching hypothesis and an Iranspecific hypothesis.
Overarching hypothesis: If sanctions are imposed, then the sanctioned country’s
capital will decrease as the technology, suppliers, or export destinations are cut off.
Iran-specific hypothesis: In Iran’s history, as imperialist countries have claimed
oil rights or as sanctions against Iranian oil have been imposed, the coercive capabilities
of the Iranian government have been increased.
Sanctions Overview
Sanctions are “punitive diplomatic, economic, and social actions taken by the
international community against a state that has violated international law” (Brown, McLean &
McMillan, 2018). Sanctions follow siege mentality (Allen, 2008). As the need for more
resources inspires war-making, a lack of resources can force capitulation by making the political
and humanitarian costs to the opposing party unbearable. In a siege, necessary resources are cut
off, and the resulting human rights abuses that occur are used as leverage for the cessation of
war. Sanctions work in much the same way – a resource or resources are cut off from a targeted
population, in hopes that the absence of that resource will be so unbearable that the sanctioning
state’s aims will be agreed to.
The siege mentality of sanctions also helps explain why targeted sanctions were
developed. Sanctions use the pain of lack of resources as leverage. It is this exact pain, applied
to all members of the target population - not just the guilty ones - that make blanket sanctions
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problematic (Neier, 2015: Pavel, & Pattison, 2015). Comprehensive sanctions increase
repression, and democracy and human rights scores drop in target governments under
comprehensive sanctions as the government passes the pain of sanctions down to its people
(Drezner, 2011: Cameron, 2005). As such, targeted sanctions were developed to attempt to limit
the restriction of resources to those who were partaking in the undesirable behavior, and their
supporters (Portela, 2016). Examples of targeted sanctions are travel bans, asset freezes, and
arms embargoes (Portela, 2016: Elliot 2005).
Sanctions can be imposed successfully only by states that have enough capital and
coercion to fully implement the sanctions. The imposing state must have enough capital so that
the loss of imports or exports with the target state will not cripple the sanctioning state.
Additionally, the sanctioning state must have enough coercive capability to implement and
enforce sanctions (Biersteker et. al., 2005). A siege on only half a city, or only on some days of
the week is not a very successful siege.
Sanctions work under an assumption that the target state does not have indefinite capital
or coercive capabilities – eventually, the government will lack the capital to provide for their
people, or they will lose the coercive capabilities needed to keep order in their state. The current
approach to sanctions involves depriving “the leadership of the benefits associated with
presenting themselves as providers of public services and infrastructure projects vis-à-vis their
citizenry” (Portela, 2016, 923). When this breakdown happens, the expectation is that the people
will revolt and the government will collapse, or the government will be willing to negotiate. In
this way, sanctions can also serve as a tool to encourage dialogue, in addition to being punitive
(Allen, 2008). It is important to note that all capital and coercion is relative, and what works in
one country will not work in another. This relativity influences the cost-benefit calculations of
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the state, not their preferences, and it is the cost-benefit calculations that drive the state to act
(Koch, 2015). It is crucial to understand the cost-benefit calculations the target state will
undertake, before implementing sanctions.
An additional complication to sanctions imposition arises out of the nature of sanctions as
an imposed punishment. The country sending sanctions is punishing the target state for behavior
that the sender deems inappropriate, or to influence the target’s behavior in the way that the
sender country desires (Molenaers et. al., 2014). As such, sanctions – targeted or otherwise – are
always more about the politics, and prominent political and economic persons, of the sender
country than the target country (Molenaers et. al., 2014: Elliot, 2005: Wallensteen, 2005). This
also helps explain why targeted sanctions have increased in popularity – if the sender country
seeks to encourage moral leadership amongst the international order, then the human rights
violations of blanket sanctions are counterproductive and the legitimacy of the sender country is
compromised (Gordon, 2015).
One of the unforeseen impacts of sanctions is how sanctions can strengthen the current
regime instead of weaken it. There are two key reasons as to why. First, sanctions increase the
need for revenue streams, and thereby strengthen the institutions created to bring in revenue.
Tilly shows that states are formed as capital-collecting mechanisms, like tax collection, are
created and maintained (Tilly, 1990). When sanctions decrease revenue streams, target
governments will attempt to collect more capital by utilizing other forms of non-sanctioned
production and trade (de Vries, Portela & Guijarro-Usobaiga, 2014: Escribá-Folch & Wright,
2010: Allen, 2008). Additionally, “trade sanctions encourage the creation of organized crime
syndicates and transnational smuggling networks” (Drezner, 2011, 98). One such example is
Hezbollah; Hezbollah has historically received funds from the Iranian and Syrian governments,
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but, “In the past few years, however, these partners have not been as generous. Iran is
undergoing devastating economic sanctions and the Syrian state is caught up in a civil war.
Hezbollah's criminal activities are designed to help plug that gap” (Levitt, 2013). When
traditional financial conduits fail, organizations turn to nontraditional methods of revenue
acquisition, such as cross-border activities like arms, drugs, and money trafficking (Levitt,
2013). Such diversification or leaks allow the targeted regime – or associated criminal and
terrorist organizations - to reinforce their presence in unexpected areas and cushion the impact of
sanctions. This element of sanctions reinforces why sanctions enforcement is so crucial and so
difficult – sanctions can only work as intended in a confined trade space.
Secondly, as capital becomes scarce, the regime can cut down on non-governmental
services. An example of non-governmental services being cut is the effect of sanctions on nongovernmental media. As capital is restricted, the government can cut grants and other funding to
media sources that do not support the regime, reducing the capabilities and reach of the
independent media and restricting free press (Peksen, 2010). When the government is the only
source of media, it is easier to influence public opinion in support of the target regime,
strengthening their influence. By turning the populace against the sending country, the target
regime can strengthen itself at the sender’s expense (Wallensteen, 2005).
The relative nature and the range of possibilities that sanctions encapsulate require a
thorough understanding of the target country, if sanctions are to be successful.
History of Iran through a Capital/Coercion Lens
As oil revenue has been a significant contributor to government spending in Iran, the
presence of capital and coercion have been inextricable for much of Iran’s recent history. In
instances where the Iranian government has controlled the lion’s share of the oil revenue, the
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Iranian government’s coercive capacity has been high. However, in instances where the Iranian
government has controlled little of the oil revenue, the Iranian government’s coercive capacity
has been low. Much of this variation in capital and coercion since 1951 has been due to foreign
interference. Two key examples of the capital and coercion tug-of-war caused by access to oil as
a key resource can be seen in 1951-53 with the oil nationalization and subsequent Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) coup, and the sanctions imposed against Iran from 2011 to the
eventual JCPOA agreement.
1951-1953
Mossadeq1 and oil nationalization
Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq was “appointed Iranian prime minister by
Muhammad Reza Shah in 1951” (Esposito, 2003). In 1951, Prime Minister Mossadeq led a
referendum that resulted in Iranian nationalization of the British-Iranian oil company, AngloIranian oil (Esposito, 2003). This was done despite the influence of Muhammad Reza Shah. The
nationalization of the oil company theoretically created increased capital for the Iranian
government, and was done in the name of increasing Iran’s resource rights (Talbot, 2015). The
National Iranian Oil Company was created, and a smooth transfer of control was attempted
(Abrahamian, 2008, 117). However, as retaliation for nationalization the British government
halted their technical support, taking oil production to a standstill (O'Neil, Fields & Share, 2018,
518). Mossadeq was able to outmaneuver the existing coercive systems to increase capital for the
Iranian people.

1
2

Abrahamian’s (2008) use of the spelling ‘Mossadeq’ is the spelling adopted throughout this analysis.
There are various arguments about the success and impact of the CIA. Further reading:
Abrahamian, E. (2008). A history of modern Iran. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University
Press, p. 118-122.
Gasiorowski, M. J. (2000). The CIA Looks Back at the 1953 Coup in Iran. Middle East Report, 216, 4-5.
Takeyh, R. (2014, June 16). What Really Happened in Iran: The CIA, the Ouster of Mosaddeq, and the

Targeted Sanctions, Case Study: Iran

Nygard 13
CIA coup

The loss of revenue from the defunded company angered the British government (Talbot,
2015: Abrahamian, 2008: Takeyh, 2014). The change in capital flows, away from the United
Kingdom and the US, triggered a response in the UK and US intelligence agencies (Esposito,
2003: Abrahamian, 2008). In 1953, the CIA allocated $1 million to sponsor demonstrations and a
political crisis to oust Mossadeq (Gasiorowski, 2000: Abrahamian, 2008: Talbot, 2015). This
undertaking was known as Operation Ajax (O'Neil, Fields & Share, 2018, 519). Mossadeq was
unable to outmaneuver the CIA - if he cut a deal with the British to return some of their oil
shares, he would be seen as selling out his country to the West (Talbot, 2015, 232). Instead, the
Iranian people were handed over to a puppet government chosen by the West. Mohammad Reza
Shah was reinstalled by the CIA in 1953 (Talbot, 2015, 138). The CIA’s involvement2 handed
control of Iranian oil back to the West.
The change in regime increased the authoritarian nature of Iran’s government. Polity IV
measures regime type; it “aggregates indicators of executive recruitment, executive
independence, and political competition into a single numerical score. The positive end of the
polity scale (+10) denotes a strongly democratic regime, while the negative end (-10) indicates a
strongly autocratic regime,” (Kliman, 2015, 30). As shown in Chart 1.1, Iran’s authoritarian
tendencies increased sharply in 1953, and remained high until the Iranian Revolution in 1979.

2

There are various arguments about the success and impact of the CIA. Further reading:
Abrahamian, E. (2008). A history of modern Iran. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University
Press, p. 118-122.
Gasiorowski, M. J. (2000). The CIA Looks Back at the 1953 Coup in Iran. Middle East Report, 216, 4-5.
Takeyh, R. (2014, June 16). What Really Happened in Iran: The CIA, the Ouster of Mosaddeq, and the
Restoration of the Shah. Council on Foreign Relations.
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Under the shah, the AngloIranian oil company was able to
recoup much of their lost company
and, in 1954, renamed themselves
British Petroleum (BP. Post war 1946-1970). The official page for
British Petroleum - now known as bp
- summarizes the 1951-1954
contention over oil as,

Chart 1.1 Polity IV Authority Trends in Iran. Taken from the Polity
IV report in 2010 on Iran, by the Center for Systemic Peace.

Within 18 months, the Iranian economy was in ruins. Mobs in the streets demanded the
prime minister’s resignation. When the parties returned to the table, they hashed out a
new arrangement allowing a consortium of companies, including Standard Oil of Indiana
(Amoco) and others, to run the oil operations in Iran. Anglo-Iranian’s stake was 40%.
(BP. Post war - 1946-1970).
The official bp narratives ignores the ways in which US government capital and coercive
capabilities were used to overwhelm Iranian government capital and coercive capabilities, in
favor of the oil companies. The CIA threw its weight behind the status quo flows of oil revenue
and government functioning, and protected pre-existing institutions like bp.
Westoxication
Western interference, the loss of oil revenues, and the reinstallation of a Western-backed
shah fueled anti-Western and anti-American sentiment in Iran, including what was termed
‘Westoxication’. Westoxication was created by
Jalal al-e Ahmad to describe the fascination with and dependence upon the West to the
detriment of traditional, historical, and cultural ties to Islam and Islamic world. Defined
as an indiscriminate borrowing from and imitation of the West, joining the twin dangers
of cultural imperialism and political domination. Implies a sense of intoxication or
infatuation that impairs rational judgement and confers an inability to see the dangers
presented by the toxic substance, that is, the West (Esposito, 2003, 337).
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This hatred of the West came to characterize much of Iranian-American interactions in the
decades that followed.
After being reinstalled by the CIA, the shah initiated a series of reforms in 1963, the
White Revolution, a secularization of Iran culture (O'Neil, Fields & Share, 2018, 519). The
benefits of the White Revolution “went largely to elites in urban environments… The presence
of Western corporations and banks fueled concerns about Western economic imperialism…
Critical religious leaders and intellectuals were harassed, tortured, exiled, arrested, and
sometimes killed” (Esposito, 2003, 337). Ayatollah Khomeini viewed the White Revolution as
American reforms, further evidence of Western corruption and influence (Secor, 2016, 28). The
Western rejection of oil nationalization, and the increase in coercive capacity to crack down on
dissidents laid the groundwork for the Islamic Revolution3, where the shah would be overthrown
and replaced with Ayatollah Khomeini.
Resource rights and resource security
For much of Iran’s history, the possession of the resource rights to oil, and capital
acquisition, have been closely tied. In Tilly’s model, capital and coercion are a closed loop; the
acquisition of one is inextricably tied to the other. Coercion costs money, and money creates
coercive bodies. The Mossadeq period and the subsequent CIA coup show that capital was less

3

The Islamic Revolution occurred in 1979 and ousted the shah from power and forced him into exile. Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Khomeini replaced him as the leader of the country, and the Islamic Republic of Iran was created.
For further reading:
Iran Chamber Society. The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran.
Khomeini, R. (2010). Islamic government. Kentucky]: SIME.
O'Neil, P., Fields, Karl J., & Share, Donald. (2018). Cases in comparative politics (Sixth ed.).
New York: W.W. Norton & Company, p. 521-532.
Abrahamian, E. (2008). A history of modern Iran. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge
University Press, p. 155-182.
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important in this period; the British, in response to the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian oil
company,
were willing to increase royalties, share management with other Western companies, and
even accept the principle of nationalization as long as it was not put into effect… The
British ambassador admitted that London was willing to go beyond the normal 50/50 deal
and give Iran as much as 60 percent of the profits so long as real ‘control’ remained in
Western hands (Abrahamian, 2008, 119).
Capital was clearly not top priority. Rather, coercion was more important – the CIA’s coercive
abilities to undermine the Iranian government were stronger than the Iranian government’s
ability to maintain control of its citizens, and eventually, its oil supply. The Iranian cry for
resource rights was not able to outlast the Western demand for resource security. The balance
between capital and coercion was no longer paramount to regime stability. Rather, relative
coercive capacities were the key factor in undermining the Iranian government; relative to the
CIA, the Iranian government’s coercive capacities were insufficient.
2006-2015
Sanctions and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
Iran’s nuclear program became an international security concern in 20064, and various
governing bodies imposed sanctions. Two intergovernmental organizations that imposed
sanctions were the European Union5 (EU) and the United Nations Security Council6 (UNSC).

4

There is an important difference between nuclear energy programs and nuclear weapons programs. Nuclear energy
programs require enrichment of uranium-235 isotopes to about twenty percent. Nuclear weapons programs require
enrichment of uranium-235 isotopes to about ninety percent. Enriching uranium-235 isotopes enough to make a
weapon requires a significant increase in technology (O'Neil, Fields & Share, 2018, 551-52: Esfandiary & Finaud,
2016). However, much of the anxiety about nuclear weapons programs is due to the same type of uranium being
needed for both. This makes monitoring agencies like the International Atomic Energy Agency essential for
ensuring JCPOA compliance. The JCPOA agreement limits the percentage of uranium enrichment, and requires
limits on technology and equipment that would lead to weapons-grade uranium (Esfandiary & Finaud, 2016).
5 European Union members are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (membership pending)
(European Union. Countries).
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The United States imposed additional sanctions, acting as an independent entity.
Sanctions predominately took two forms: nuclear and petroleum. Sanctions were directed
towards crippling Iran’s nuclear program, or towards petroleum imports and exports in an
attempt to cripple revenue streams. Sanctions on Iran’s petroleum were possible because of
Iran’s involvement in the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) beginning in
1960 (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. Brief History). Over the next two
decades, OPEC countries worked together to control production to influence oil prices;
eventually, OPEC was able to increase international oil prices by four hundred percent in 1973,
triggering an oil crisis (Black, Hashimzade, & Myles, 2017, 370-371). During this time, many of
OPEC members were able to take “control of their domestic petroleum industries” (Organization
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. Brief History). After Iran had taken control of domestic
oil, direct sanctions on Iran were possible, without sanctioning any outside, Western parties like
bp.
The UNSC imposed targeted sanctions on Iran for their nuclear program in 2006. These
sanctions continued in various resolutions until the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA) was implemented in October 2015. The various means of sanctioning Iran are outlined
in Table 1.1.

6

There are five permanent members of the Security Council: China, France, Russia, the UK, and the US (United
Nations Security Council. Current Members). There are ten rotating members, and in 2015 the rotating members
were Venezuela (2015-16), Spain (2015-16), Nigeria (2014-15), New Zealand (2015-16), Malaysia (2015-16),
Lithuania (2014-15), Jordan (2014-15), Chile (2014-15), Chad (2014-15), and Angola (2015-16) (United Nations
Security Council. Countries Elected Members of the Security Council).
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Episode 1

Resolution
UNSCR 1737

December 23, 2006 –
March 24, 2007

Episode 2

Resolution
UNSCR 1747

March 24, 2007 - March
3, 2008

Episode 3

Resolution
UNSCR 1803

March 3, 2008 – June 9,
2010

Episode 4

Resolution
UNSCR 1929

June 9, 2010 – June 14,
2013

Episode 5

Resolutions
UNSCR 2159
UNSCR 2224
UNSCR 2231

June 14, 2013 – present*
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Nuclear proliferation-related technology
and goods imports and exports ban; asset
freeze on supporting entities and
individuals.
Nuclear proliferation-related technology
and goods imports and exports ban; asset
freeze on supporting entities.
Added embargo on arms exports.
Nuclear proliferation-related technology
and goods imports and exports ban; asset
freeze on supporting entities; embargo on
arms exports.
Added travel ban.
Nuclear proliferation-related technology
and goods imports and exports ban; asset
freeze on supporting entities; embargo on
arms exports; travel ban.
Added embargo on specific arms imports,
nuclear proliferation investment ban, and
as-needed bunkering ban.
Nuclear proliferation-related technology
and goods imports and exports ban; asset
freeze on supporting entities; embargo on
arms exports; travel ban; embargo on
specific arms imports, nuclear proliferation
investment ban, and as-needed bunkering
ban.

Table 1.2 United Nations Security Council sanctions against Iran. UNSCR 2231 endorses the JCPOA,
and previous resolutions sanctioning Iran will be terminated based on JCPOA compliance and at
conclusion of the Security Council consideration of Iranian nuclear proliferation.
Data taken from the Global Governance Centre’s SanctionsApp.

UNSC sanctions are restricted primarily to nuclear proliferation activities and support
networks for proliferation like technology and investment. The UNSC sanctions are an important
part of keeping the focus on nuclear proliferation. Sanctions imposed by other entities branch out
beyond nuclear proliferation, but the UNSC sanctions are a vital part of the collective siege that
led Iran to the negotiating table in 2015. The impact of UNSC sanctions had a significant impact
on the Iranian economy; “one former Iranian official admitted in late 2008 that the UN sanctions
had increased the price of imports anywhere from ten to thirty percent” (Drezner, 2011, 103104). The UNSC enforcement of sanctions increased the coercive pressure on Iran, and overlaps
with asset and entity freezes imposed by other entities.
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In addition to UNSC sanctions, the US imposed sanctions as well. The Comprehensive
Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (Public Law No: 111-195) was
adopted into law on July 1, 2010. This act expanded upon the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996
regarding petroleum sanctions, in Section 102. In addition, sections 103, 104, and 105 specify
the imposition of an import an export ban, an asset freeze, and a travel ban against select entities
related to proliferation, respectively.
The EU sanctions imposed by Iran included petroleum sanctions. Petroleum sanctions are
a significant piece of an effective Iranian sanctions regime. “In order to exert maximum pressure
on targets, the international community needs to identify the means by which targets maintain
their ability to pose a threat to international peace and security” (Biersteker et. al., 2005, 62).
When Iran is the country under consideration, oil must be considered, as it is a key capitalproducing resource in their economy. As oil is a key source of capital, it enables the funding of
the Iranian nuclear program; the EU sanctions were effective because they targeted “Iran’s oil
industry, prohibiting the insurance cover of oil

Year

Oil volume
(1000 barrels)

Total value
($1000)

Import %

2006

248,617

15,101,399

5.54

2007

238,313

15,988,760

5.41

2008

205,137

19,519,766

4.62

2009

177,581

10,729,791

4.38

2010

212,749

16,400,313

5.28

2011

218,375

23,459,966

5.64

2012

50,315

5,616,591

1.25

2013

0

0

0

2014

3,265

272,415

0.08

2015

0

0

0

2016

106,400

4,566,536

2.69

2017
199,968
9,988,305
4.96
Table 1.2 Data taken from the European
Commission Directorate-General for Energy:
Registration of Crude Oil Imports and Deliveries in
the European Union, 2006-2017.

shipping, freezing Iran’s Central Bank assets in
the EU and cutting off Iranian banks from the
global… payment network” (de Vries, Portela
& Guijarro-Usobaiga, 2014, 5). The targeting
of Iran’s oil industry included decreased or
eliminated imports of Iranian oil from 2012 to
2015 (European Commission DirectorateGeneral for Energy). This decrease can be seen
in Table 1.2. These sanctions led to a
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significant decrease in Iranian oil production (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2018).
It is important to note the difficulty with imposing petroleum sanctions at all. EscribáFolch and Wright show that “sanctions are less destabilizing in oil-producing countries, perhaps
because demand for oil is highly inelastic in most sanction-sending countries, making them
reluctant to disrupt energy supplies” (2010). The need for a unified party of sending countries
becomes clear – because the need for oil is so inelastic, sanctioned countries will merely pivot to
fill the needs of other countries. The Iran sanctions, and the resultant negotiations of the JCPOA,
were successful largely because of the number of countries willing to boycott Iranian oil. In
future sanctions, similar unity on behalf of sender countries will be needed in order to properly
sanction Iran.
When the UNSC, the US, and the EU sanctions were imposed, Iran’s capital decreased as
the technology, suppliers, and export destinations were cut off. The combined effect of US,
UNSC, and EU sanctions had an important effect on Iranian domestic politics; President Hassan
Rouhani was elected in November 2013 on a platform of sanctions relief and improved relations
with the West (Esfandiary & Finaud, 2016). Rouhani’s election was crucial, as it countered the
anti-West sentiments of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei (Finaud, 2018). President
Rouhani was able to communicate directly with President Obama and his administration about
sanctions relief, which was an important step in negotiating the JCPOA (Finaud, 2018). In this
way, sanctions were an important part of encouraging the dialogue needed to reach an
agreement, and the eventual cessation of sanctions. To quote former Secretary of State Madeline
Albright, “The purpose of foreign policy is to influence the policies and actions of other nations
in a way that serves your interests and values. The tools available include everything from kind
words to cruise missiles. Mixing them properly and with sufficient patience is the art of
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diplomacy” (Albright & Woodward, 2003, 406). Sanctions, as a tool between words and war on
the diplomatic spectrum, was a punitive measure that evolved into a desire for dialogue. Without
such evolution, the JCPOA would have been much more difficult to negotiate (Finaud, 2018).
The JCPOA itself is an agreement between Iran, the High Representative of the European
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK, and the
US, for the purpose of allowing Iran to develop a peaceful nuclear energy program within
defined parameters, with the goal of lifting sanctions (UNSC Resolution 2231). The agreement
includes a provision for the monitoring of the nuclear program by an independent international
agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (UNSC Resolution 2231). The
agreement affirms that Iran will not seek to develop nuclear weapons, that the involved countries
will uphold the JCPOA in spirit and in practice, and marks a turning point in Iranian relations
with the international community (UNSC Resolution 2231). The JCPOA marks the cessation of
UNSC sanctions and EU sanctions against Iran; additionally, paragraph 20 of the JCPOA
outlines the cessation of US sanctions against Iran, including petroleum sanctions and asset
freezes (UNSC Resolution 2231). In paragraph 26, the agreement notes that “Iran has stated that
it will treat such a re-introduction or re-imposition of the [US] sanctions… or such an imposition
of new nuclear-related sanctions, as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this
JCPOA in whole or in part” (UNSC Resolution 2231). The JCPOA provides for monitoring and
reassurance for the EU, China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK, and the US, while also
providing a safeguard for Iran in the case of member noncompliance. The JCPOA was a
collective agreement, spawned by the collective sanctioning actions of multiple international
groups and state actors. The international siege of Iran led to an opportunity for dialogue, which
resulted in a comprehensive international agreement.
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Natural resources secured, capital chokehold
In 1951, Mossadeq nationalized Iranian oil under the assumption that resource rights to
oil would provide increased capital for the Iranian government and the Iranian people. The
sanctions of the 2000s and 2010s show that this is not the case. The current international system
mandates the need for exports to create revenue and create energy security; capital is no longer
about what you possess, but also about whom you can sell to. In today’s international system,
“what goes on inside states… often matters intensely to other members of the international
system,” (Fukuyama, 2004, 92). This provides incentive for the outside states to apply coercion
against the primary state, in order to limit the primary state’s capital. State building is no longer
an isolated activity as it was for states in Europe; rather, the capital and coercion cost-benefit
calculations of the international system and outside states are often just as important to state
formation as internal capital-coercion balances. Tilly’s model of capital and coercion still
applies, but the balance must be expanded to calculate for other states as well. In the case of
Iranian sanctions, the key balance was between EU, US, and UNSC coercion on one side, and
Iranian capital on the other. A further breakdown could argue that the key balance was between
EU, US, and UNSC capital on one side, and Iranian capital on the other; Tilly shows that
coercion costs money, so the sanctioning actors had to have enough expendable capital to be able
to afford coercive measures, and still have enough capital to maintain their own functioning.
Such sanctions regimes, then, can only be truly effective in a globalized world with
numerous trade deals. EU oil sanctions would not have been possible if Iran was the world’s
only oil supplier; the EU had to have other trade deals with other countries, and access to enough
oil to make Iran’s supply irrelevant, or the EU import reduction negligible, in order to still
maintain energy security and sanction Iran at the same time.
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An important takeaway from the 2006-2015 period is the relative importance of Iranian
capital versus the capital of the rest of the world, and Iranian capital versus the coercive
capabilities of the rest of the world. The coercive capabilities needed to enforce sanctions acts as
a balance against the capital of Iran. The capital-coercion balance of Tilly is no longer confined
to the internal workings of the state.
Discussion
Sanctions decrease a country’s capital as the technology, suppliers, or export destinations
are cut off. The siege quality of sanctions restricts the options available in the target country’s
cost-benefit analyses, and thereby punishes the target country while encouraging dialogue.
Regardless of resource rights or available capital, sanctions are expensive politically or
monetarily because they restrict options. The sanctioning state’s assumption is that such
restriction will become too costly to bear, and the sanctioned state will capitulate. As such, the
hypothesis that ‘sanctions imposition leads to a decrease in capital, as the technology, suppliers,
or export destinations are cut off’ is supported.
In the case of Iran in 1953, the loss of oil revenues to bp shows that Tilly’s model of
capital and coercion must be expended to include external forces, as external forces can be
powerful factors in state formation. The CIA’s relative coercive capabilities were able to tip
Iran’s coercion-capital balance in the favor of the US and the UK. 1953 indicated how important
international interests would be in Iran’s continual state formation process; such a process is
constantly ongoing. The need for Iran to consider outside interests in its domestic politics, and its
internal capital-coercion cost-benefit calculations, would have important ramifications for the
sanctions imposed several decades later.
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The 2006-2015 sanctions regimes, imposed by the US, EU, and UNSC reinforced the
multiple dimensions of Tilly’s theory. No longer are capital-coercion calculations limited to the
state. Rather, such calculations can be conducted state to state, state to international organization,
international organization to international organization, (or in the case of Iran, state to state to
international organization to international organization) and all have crucial ramifications for
internal state formation.
The forcible change of Iran’s government increased the Iranian government’s coercive
capabilities, in the form of CIA interference and the White Revolution. Tilly’s theory postulates
that an increase in capital will be tied to an increase in coercion (Tilly 1990). Sanctions literature
shows that a decrease in capital often leads to an increase in coercion, as human rights decrease
(Allen 2008; Gordon, 2015; Neier, 2015; Pavel & Pattison, 2015; Cameron, 2005; Drezner,
2011). Together, Tilly and sanctions literature show that as capital decreases, coercion increases
to maintain control over the preexisting population; additionally, as capital increases, coercion
increases in response to maintain control over the rising capital. In both cases, capital is the
variable that moves first, and coercion responds. However, in 1953 in Iran, coercion increased as
the CIA reinstalled the shah, and after coercion increased then capital decreased as oil revenues
were moved back to the West. And in the sanctions regimes of 2006-2015, coercion in the form
of sanctions were imposed, and Iranian capital decreased. In Iran’s history, the coercive
capabilities of the Iranian government have been increased as imperialist countries have claimed
oil rights or as sanctions against Iranian oil have been imposed. As such, the Iran-specific
hypothesis is not supported; the Iran case study reverses the sequence of more (or less) capital
leading to more (or less) coercion, to more coercion creating less capital.
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Conclusion
Sanctions are marked by an increase in coercion and a subsequent decrease in capital. As
such, Charles Tilly’s capital and coercion state formation theory provides a valuable framework
for analyzing the impact of sanctions. Tilly’s theory of state formation claims that states increase
coercive capacities in response to an increase in capital. The 1953 CIA coup shows that capital
decreases after external coercion is implemented. The 2006-2015 sanctions regimes against Iran
show that sanctions decrease a country’s capital as the improvement and/or export opportunities
are cut off. Taken together, both of these episodes in Iran’s history show that capital and
coercion are still intertwined and crucial for a country’s state formation. However, Tilly’s model
must be expanded to include the capital and coercion influences of external actors, and is no
longer confined to the formation of a solitary state.
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